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Cambodia is a small fragile state in Southeast Asia that is highly exposed to the 
effects of climate change. While there is a burgeoning body of research on the effects of 
climate change on security outcomes, there is limited research on the relationship between 
climate change and migration, particularly in Cambodia. The purpose of this study is 
twofold: first, to analyze subnational climate vulnerabilities in Cambodia with a specific 
emphasis on water availability; second, to analyze the relationship between water 
availability and migration in Cambodia. The study first uses a mix of quantitative and 
qualitative data to establish the political, economic, and social conditions necessary for 
climate change to affect migration. Then, the study uses Esri’s Emerging Hot Spot Analysis 
tool to identify precipitation trends on a subnational level. Finally, the study uses 
qualitative and quantitative data, including focus group interviews, to analyze subnational 
migration patterns in relation to subnational precipitation patterns and provide a holistic 
picture of Cambodia’s climate-migration nexus. The study finds that precipitation is 
decreasing in the northwest provinces of Banteay Meanchey, Battambang, Oddar 
 vii 
Meanchey, and Siem Reap, where the bulk of the population is reliant on traditional rice 
agriculture, which is highly vulnerable to the effects of climate change. The study also 
concludes that households that have experienced crop loss, drought, and poor rainfall are 
more likely to have a family member migrate the following year. If the northwest continues 
to experience a drying trend, it is likely that more individuals will migrate from these 
provinces in the future. Future research should address two things: first, how climate 
change projections for the country vary spatially and temporally; and second, how climate 
change and migration are quantitatively linked. Finally, the Cambodian government and 
international organizations should direct funding towards research to better understand the 
situation in northwestern Cambodia and policies that increase the resilience of the region’s 
agricultural communities. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
Cambodia, a small, low-income, Southeast Asian country, is a highly fragile state 
due to the environmental vulnerabilities, population pressures, and governance problems it 
faces. Climate change, including medium- and long-term changes in precipitation, 
temperature, and weather systems due to human emissions of greenhouse gasses, 
compounds these issues. Cambodia is dependent on the monsoon rains for agriculture and 
climate change is likely to increase the unpredictability of the monsoon pattern, exposing 
populations in the Mekong River Basin and around Tonle Sap Lake to heavy rainfall 
variation.1 Potential consequences include water scarcity, food scarcity, agricultural loss, 
property loss, lowered biodiversity, and the spread of vector-borne diseases.2 A significant 
proportion of Cambodians are at risk, as 45% of the population lives in high climate 
exposure areas and 20% of the population lives in very high exposure areas.3 
Low economic diversity and poor governance exacerbate these risks. 
Approximately 67% of Cambodians rely on agriculture for a source of income.4 The 
primary crop, rice, depends on water availability and rice yields are predicted to decrease 
under most scenarios from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).5 
Cambodia’s government is nominally democratic, but President Hun Sen and the 
 
1 Amodwala, Juhi. 2018. “Cambodia.” Country Mini-Brief. Strauss Center Brumley Next Generation 
Fellows Program. 
2 Hoegh-Guldberg, O, D Jacob, M Taylor, M Bindi, S Brown, I Camilloni, A Diedhiou, et al. 2018. 
“Impacts of 1.5 C Global Warming on Natural and Human Systems.” In Global Warming of 1.5 C: An 
IPCC Special Report on the Impacts of Global Warming of 1.5 C above Pre-Industrial Levels and Related 
Global Greenhouse Gas Emission Pathways, in the Context of Strengthening the Global Response to the 
Threat of Climate Change, Sustainable Development, and Efforts to Eradicate Poverty. Geneva, 
Switzerland. 
3 Moran, Ashley, Joshua Busby, Clionadh Raleigh, Todd Smith, Roudabeh Kishi, Nisha Krishnan, and 
Charles Wight. 2018. “The Intersection of Global Fragility and Climate Risks.” USAID. 
4 World Bank Group. World Bank Open Data. https://data.worldbank.org 
5 Hoegh-Guldberg, O, et al 
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Cambodia Peoples’ Party (CPP) have retained power for over 30 years. The government 
relies on foreign aid for 30% of its budget and critical agencies such as the Ministry of 
Agriculture have 100% financing gaps for climate projects.6 In a report for USAID, Moran 
et al. categorized Cambodia as highly fragile, based largely on poor effectiveness and 
legitimacy indicators.7 Polity IV has also rated Cambodia’s governance poorly, with low 
scores for democracy and political competition, showing an increasing trend towards 
authoritarianism.8 Without proper government support, the lack of state capacity and poor 
adaptive capacity leaves a large proportion of the population deeply exposed to climate 
hazards. Climate change is an increasing threat to security, and the combination of 
exposure and poor governance makes Cambodia particularly vulnerable to climate change-
related risks.9 However, there is significant debate in the climate security field over the 
nature of the relationship between climate change and security risks. 
The purpose of this research is to analyze climate vulnerabilities and security risks 
in Cambodia. This research uses a combination of quantitative data measures and 
qualitative interviews to offer a holistic picture of the climate-security vulnerability nexus 
in Cambodia and propose policy solutions geared toward reducing climate vulnerability 
and security risks. 
 
6 Seyma, Un. 2018. “Review of Implementation Challenges Posed by the Climate Change Action Plan 
2014-2018 in Cambodia: Case Studies of Three Ministries.” Phnom Penh Cambodia: Parliamentary 
Institute of Cambodia. This research indicates that while climate projects are planned, they are meeting 0% 
of their funding needs for said projects. 
7 Moran, Ashley et al. 
8 “Polity IV Project: Home Page,” accessed November 8, 2018, 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4x.htm. In 2017, Cambodia had a score of 0 on Democracy and 
4 on Autocracy. Both are scored on a composite scale of 0-10, where 10 indicates strong institutionalized 
systems. 
9 “Report on Effects of a Changing Climate to the Department of Defense” (Office of the Under Secretary 
of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, January 2019), 
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5689153-DoD-Final-Climate-Report.html. 
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Chapter 2:  Literature Review 
The role of climate change in accelerating or exacerbating conflict is a growing 
concern. Organizations such as the U.S. Department of Defense, the United Nations 
Security Council, and the U.S. intelligence community have recognized the role of climate 
change in acting as a “threat multiplier,” exacerbating existing conflict or creating 
conditions for new conflict to break out.10 However, describing climate change as a threat 
multiplier is not useful without a deeper understanding of the circumstances under which 
climate change leads to negative security outcomes. 
The mechanisms underlying the connection between climate change and conflict 
are often ambiguous or difficult to statistically link. Several studies have aimed to draw 
quantitative connections between climate effects such as temperature or rainfall variability 
and armed conflict, but the results are mixed.11 Early literature focused on determining 
whether there was a direct correlation between climate effects and the incidence of 
violence, but more recent literature has moved towards studying the indirect pathways 
between climate effects and different types of conflict.12 Climate change alone is unlikely 
to cause conflict. Rather, climate change affects the “dynamics of interaction between 
societal actors.”13  
There are four primary causal pathways: agricultural production and food prices, 
economic growth, migration, and disasters. However, not all of these are relevant in 
 
10 “Report on Effects of a Changing Climate to the Department of Defense.” 
    “Climate Change Recognized as ‘Threat Multiplier’, UN Security Council Debates Its Impact on Peace,” 
UN News, January 25, 2019, https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/01/1031322. 
     Daniel Coats, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community” (Senate Select 
Comittee on Intelligence, January 29, 2019). 
11 Joshua Busby, “Taking Stock: The Field of Climate and Security,” Current Climate Change Reports 4, 
no. 4 (December 2018): 338–46, https://doi.org/10.1007/s40641-018-0116-z. 
12 Busby. 
13 Halvard Buhaug, “Climate Change and Conflict: Taking Stock,” Peace Economics, Peace Science and 
Public Policy 22, no. 4 (December 1, 2016): 331–38, https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2016-0034. 
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Cambodia. Many rural Cambodians are subsistence farmers and are highly dependent on 
natural resources for their livelihoods, making them extremely sensitive to changes in 
rainfall and other water resources. Given this high dependence on natural resources, the 
most likely causal pathway for climate to cause security issues in Cambodia is through 
decreased agricultural production and resulting migration. Cambodia is a Least Developed 
Country, with an annual gross national income per capita of $1,390 and a population of 16 
million.14 The poverty rate has decreased from 53% in 2004 to 18% in 2012. This decrease 
in poverty is fragile, however, as more than 60% of the reduction was in the agricultural 
sector, where a loss of $0.70/day would return the poverty rate back to 40%.15 Seventy-
nine percent of the population resides in rural areas while 67 percent of the population is 
employed in agriculture. Rice is the most common crop, with around 70% of the farmland 
under rice production.16 Despite the high employment in agriculture, only 23.4% of 
Cambodia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) comes from agriculture, forestry, and 
fishing.17 There is emerging data on growing migration out of Cambodia’s rural areas in 
response to changes in rainfall variability and agricultural output.18 
AGRICULTURE AND FOOD PRICES 
Numerous studies have looked at the effect of agricultural production and food 
prices on conflict. Food prices, food production, and food insecurity are the causal 
pathways between climate change and security events, although studies have treated these 
 
14 World Bank, “Cambodia | Data,” accessed November 27, 2018, 
https://data.worldbank.org/country/Cambodia. 
15 “Cambodian Agriculture in Transition: Opportunities and Risks,” Text/HTML, World Bank, accessed 
December 5, 2019, https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/cambodia/publication/cambodian-agriculture-in-
transition-opportunities-and-risks. 
16 “Cambodian Agriculture in Transition.” 
17 World Bank, “Cambodia | Data.” 
18 “Migration and Families Left Behind in Cambodia,” International Organization for Migration, February 
2, 2018, https://www.iom.int/news/migration-and-families-left-behind-cambodia. 
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variables differently. Decreases in agricultural production can lower the opportunity cost 
of rebelling by diminishing formal sources of income, while higher food prices may be a 
source of grievance for citizens.19 Lowered agricultural yield and loss of livelihoods may 
lead to increases in migration, stressing government resources or placing pressure along 
ethnic fissure lines. 
Wischnath and Buhaug identified three processes through which loss of food 
production can escalate into conflict: lowered opportunity cost of rebelling, increased 
opportunities for recruitment, and widespread social grievances.20 The study focused on 
changes in food production rather than rainfall variability, assuming that changes in 
agricultural production would capture broader changes in climate conditions. Using 
political violence in India from 1980 to 2011, they examined how yearly fluctuations in 
food production affected the severity of ongoing conflicts. They argued that environmental 
stress put people’s livelihoods at risk, particularly those dependent on agricultural output. 
The loss of harvests and corresponding income would result in higher unemployment. If 
the state failed to support such individuals, incentives to join an ongoing insurgency would 
increase. Ultimately, the study found that harvest loss was associated with increased levels 
of political violence. However, their focus on ongoing conflict narrowed the scope of the 
study and precluded any conclusions about the pathways to conflict.  
A broad literature review by Hendrix and Brinkman discussed the relationship 
between food insecurity and civil and communal conflict.21 Civil conflict affects almost 
 
19 Emily Meierding, “Climate Change and Conflict: Avoiding Small Talk about the Weather,” 
International Studies Review 15, no. 2 (June 2013): 185–203, https://doi.org/10.1111/misr.12030. 
20 Gerdis Wischnath and Halvard Buhaug, “Rice or Riots: On Food Production and Conflict Severity 
across India,” Political Geography 43 (November 2014): 6–15, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2014.07.004. 
21 Cullen Hendrix and Henk-Jan Brinkman, “Food Insecurity and Conflict Dynamics: Causal Linkages and 
Complex Feedbacks,” Stability: International Journal of Security & Development 2, no. 2 (June 17, 2013): 
26, https://doi.org/10.5334/sta.bm. 
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exclusively food-insecure and less-developed countries. While some researchers argue that 
military organizations recruit fighters through promises for food and shelter, the empirical 
evidence is mixed.22 Acute food insecurity may actually diminish conflict by reducing 
available resources and hindering political participation. Communal conflict affects areas 
where land and water are scarce, although the link to climate shocks is again uncertain. 
While some research indicates communal conflict is more prevalent during times of 
abundance, other studies indicate it is more prevalent during times of food insecurity.23  
Lagi et al. examined the role of global food prices in uprisings in the Middle East 
in 2008 and 2011, arguing that large peaks in global food prices coincided with food riots 
and protests associated with major unrest.24 They argued food prices were the precipitating 
condition for social unrest, particularly for food-importing countries with widespread 
poverty. However, Smith counters that relating global food prices to country-level conflict 
simplifies complex relationships between international and domestic prices, given that 
global prices may not be the actual prices people pay.25 While Lagi et al. researched conflict 
specific to food-related grievances, Smith argued that populations perceive their hardship 
differently, and grievances may not be addressed the same way. Additionally, states may 
insulate their citizens from food price shocks through domestic subsidies.  
 
22 Ana Arjona and Stathis Kalyvas, “A Micro-Level Approach to Armed Organizations” (Yale University, 
February 2008). 
     Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy M. Weinstein, “Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation in 
Civil War,” American Journal of Political Science 52, no. 2 (April 2008): 436–55, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00322.x. 
23 Ole Magnus Theisen, “Climate Clashes? Weather Variability, Land Pressure, and Organized Violence in 
Kenya, 1989–2004,” Journal of Peace Research 49, no. 1 (January 2012): 81–96, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343311425842. 
     Mareike Schomerus and Tim Allen, “Southern Sudan at Odds with Itself: Dynamics of Conflict and 
Predicaments of Peace,” January 2010. 
24 Marco Lagi, Karla Z. Bertrand, and Yaneer Bar-Yam, “The Food Crises and Political Instability in North 
Africa and the Middle East,” ArXiv:1108.2455 [Physics], August 11, 2011, http://arxiv.org/abs/1108.2455. 
25 Todd Smith, “Research Brief - Food Price Spikes and Social Unrest in Africa” (Climate Change and 
African Political Stability, April 2013). 
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Smith’s analysis addressed the correlation between rainfall scarcity and conflict. 
While there may not have been direct conflict over water resources, he argued that rainfall 
scarcity affected agriculture, thereby changing food prices and leading to security 
consequences. All else equal, the study found accumulated rainfall of one standard 
deviation below the long-term mean was associated with a 0.264% increase in domestic 
food prices from the previous month and that a 1% increase in the domestic consumer food 
price index led to a 24.1% increase in the odds of unrest. The study concluded that sudden 
increases in consumer food prices in a given month contributed significantly to an increase 
in the probability of any kind of social unrest in that month. 
However, different types of states treat food prices and subsidies differently. 
Hendrix and Haggard found a divide between democracies and autocracies.26 They found 
that governments often shift food subsidies from rural residents to urban consumers, 
especially in autocratic governments where discontented urban populations pose a risk to 
authoritarian powers. Additionally, the study found that democracies and hybrid regimes 
experience more urban unrest during times of high food prices. In autocracies, they found 
no relationship between food prices and urban unrest. 27  
Finally, political exclusion and ethnic fissures may also play a role in the 
agriculture-conflict nexus. Von Uexkull et al. took an innovative approach by examining 
ethnic groups, drought during the primary crop season, and political exclusion to find a 
statistically significant link between climate change and conflict in Asia and Africa.28 They 
theorized that the vulnerability to climate extremes is a function of groups’ dependence on 
 
26 Cullen S Hendrix and Stephan Haggard, “Global Food Prices, Regime Type, and Urban Unrest in the 
Developing World,” Journal of Peace Research 52, no. 2 (March 2015): 143–57, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343314561599. 
27 Hybrid regimes are mixed regimes that are neither fully democratic nor fully autocratic. 
28 Nina von Uexkull et al., “Civil Conflict Sensitivity to Growing-Season Drought,” Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences 113, no. 44 (November 1, 2016): 12391–96, 
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1607542113. 
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natural resources, the sensitivity of the ecosystem, and the group’s coping ability. This 
leads communities on non-irrigated lands to be particularly vulnerable, especially if they 
have low socioeconomic development, a history of conflict, and limited access to economic 
and social capital. Their analysis found that drought had little effect on the short-term 
conflict risk under most conditions. However, for agriculturally dependent and politically 
excluded groups in poor countries, local drought increased the likelihood of sustained 
violence.  
MIGRATION 
Migration is a relatively unexplored pathway, although it is increasingly important. 
A 2018 World Bank report noted that climate change could force 143 million people to 
move internally by 2050, 40.5 million of those in South Asia.29 It is likely that urban areas 
will become hotspots of in-migration and rural-to-urban migration will grow. Some 
literature has suggested that climate-induced migration could destabilize neighboring states 
or bring ethnic groups with divergent beliefs in contact with each other.30 Conversely, 
climate migration due to crises may elicit empathy rather than conflict – receiving countries 
may view such migration as an act of nature.31 Regardless, given the influx in Central 
American migration to the United States and increasing anti-immigrant rhetoric in the U.S., 
which some have linked to climate factors, it’s clear that large-scale migration due to 
climate change has serious security implications.32 
 
29 Kanta Kumari Rigaud et al., “Groundswell: Preparing for Internal Climate Migration” (The World Bank, 
March 19, 2018). 
30 Rafael Reuveny, “Climate Change-Induced Migration and Violent Conflict,” Political Geography 26, 
no. 6 (August 2007): 656–73, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2007.05.001. 
31 Clionadh Raleigh, Lisa Jordan, and Idean Salehyan, “Assessing the Impact of Climate Change on 
Migration and Conflict” (The World Bank, 2008). 
32 Laura Sigelmann, “The Hidden Driver: Climate Change and Migration in Central America’s Northern 
Triangle” (American Security Project, September 6, 2019), 
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Research by Koubi et al. shows a distinction between the effects of long-term and 
sudden-onset environmental events on migration.33 Their analysis found that perceptions 
of long-term environmental events reduced migration while perceptions of sudden-onset 
environmental events increased the likelihood of migration. However, they simply 
addressed the environmental motivation to migrate rather than the host-country 
consequences. Reuveny examined 38 cases of environmental migration and found that the 
majority had multiple environmental factors: 27 had land degradation, 19 droughts, 17 
deforestation, 15 water scarcity, 9 floods, 7 storms, and 5 famines.34 Conflict was present 
in 19 of the 38 cases. However, Reuveny did not directly link those conflicts to the presence 
of migrants and the sample was too small to generalize.  
Salehyan and Gleditsch found that refugees can create conflict with existing 
residents if they compete for finite government resources.35 They argue that population 
movements can help spread conflict, particularly if they alter the ethnic composition of a 
state, exacerbate economic competition, or facilitate the flow of arms or ideologies. 
However, they do not address climate migrants, which Raleigh et al. suggest are different 
from refugees because their movements are more likely to be temporary.36 Further, climate 
migrants are more likely to elicit sympathy from receiving locations due to the perception 
that their migration was forced by nature. They are also more likely to be vulnerable and 




33 Vally Koubi et al., “Environmental Stressors and Migration: Evidence from Vietnam,” World 
Development 79 (March 2016): 197–210, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.11.016. 
34 Reuveny, “Climate Change-Induced Migration and Violent Conflict.” 
35 Idean Salehyan and Kristian Gleditsch, “Refugees and the Spread of Civil War,” International 
Organization 60, no. 2 (2006): 335–66. 
36 Raleigh, Jordan, and Salehyan, “Assessing the Impact of Climate Change on Migration and Conflict.” 
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Migration can also be seen as an intermediary and bidirectional causal variable. 
Freeman finds that directly connecting environmental change to migration and conflict 
misses important intervening variables.37 She argues that attention needs to be paid to local-
level manifestations of conflict and maladaptive migration. The study finds that, while 
environmental factors alone may not be necessary or sufficient to cause migration or 
conflict, they form part of a broader picture of migration and conflict. She suggests further 
research is needed to understand the patterns of interconnectedness and whether migration 
is truly an intermediary variable. 
UNDERLYING CONDITIONS 
 One persistent question is whether political and social factors should be included 
as control variables in statistical models. A series of competing studies and responses 
between a group of Berkeley economists led by Hsiang and Burke and a group from Peace 
Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) led by Buhaug largely represents this debate. While the 
Berkeley scholars have found strong correlations between climate-related variables and 
conflict, PRIO scholars have countered their findings.  
Burke et al. found that warmer temperatures led to increases in the likelihood of 
civil war and a follow-up meta-analysis found that each standard deviation in climate 
correlated to a 4% rise in interpersonal violence and 14% rise in intergroup conflict.38 
Buhaug countered that their use of country fixed-effects masked the important effects of 
 
37 Laura Freeman, “Environmental Change, Migration, and Conflict in Africa: A Critical Examination of 
the Interconnections,” The Journal of Environment & Development 26, no. 4 (December 2017): 351–74, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1070496517727325. 
38 M. B. Burke et al., “Warming Increases the Risk of Civil War in Africa,” Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences 106, no. 49 (December 8, 2009): 20670–74, 
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0907998106. 
     S. M. Hsiang, M. Burke, and E. Miguel, “Quantifying the Influence of Climate on Human Conflict,” 
Science 341, no. 6151 (September 13, 2013): 1235367–1235367, https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1235367 
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politics. He argued that measures for ethno-political context, economic development, and 
time displayed significant effects on conflict and thus cannot be left out.39 However, Hsiang 
et al. counter that the inconsistency is due to model selection and methodological 
differences. They argue that the use of fixed-effects standardizes differences between 
locations and is necessary to quantify the relationship between climate and conflict.40 
Additionally, they state that many typical control variables are correlated with climate 
variables, thus underestimating the effect of climate measures.  
 Similarly, a number of scholars identify institutions as a potential mediating factor 
that can amplify or diminish the risk of conflict. Busby highlights the importance of 
institutions and the supporting role that they play in diminishing or exacerbating conflict.41 
Salehyan and Hendrix as well as Hendrix and Haggard both split samples by regime type.42 
Von Uexkull et al. include the role of political exclusion in their model.43 Tir and Stinnett 
find that effective river basin institutions reduce the risk of conflict by allocating water and 
mediating disputes.44 The effects of these intervening variables are critical for 
understanding country-level causal pathways. 
 
39 H. Buhaug, “Climate Not to Blame for African Civil Wars,” Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences 107, no. 38 (September 21, 2010): 16477–82, https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1005739107. 
40 S. M. Hsiang, M. Burke, and E. Miguel, “Quantifying the Influence of Climate on Human Conflict,” 
Science 341, no. 6151 (September 13, 2013): 1235367–1235367, https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1235367. 
41 Buhaug, “Climate Change and Conflict.” 
42 Cullen Hendrix and Idean Salehyan, “Climate Shocks and Political Violence: Beyond Scarcity, Beyond 
Africa” (Robert S. Strauss Center, 2012). 
     Hendrix and Haggard, “Global Food Prices, Regime Type, and Urban Unrest in the Developing World.” 
43 von Uexkull et al., “Civil Conflict Sensitivity to Growing-Season Drought.” 
44 Jaroslav Tir and Douglas M Stinnett, “Weathering Climate Change: Can Institutions Mitigate 
International Water Conflict?,” Journal of Peace Research 49, no. 1 (January 2012): 211–25, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343311427066. 
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LITERATURE ON CAMBODIA 
There is relatively little literature on climate change and conflict in Cambodia, 
despite its high vulnerability to climate change. Ratner et al. found that most conflicts in 
the Tonlé Sap Lake area were due to competition related to overfishing, including conflict 
between large and small-scale fishers or between villages. More recently, however, 
different types of conflict have emerged. This includes competition over water, 
infrastructure, land use, and biodiversity conservation. They found three key areas of 
conflict: (1) illegal fishing, (2) clearance of flooded forest for agriculture, and (3) conflict 
between fishers and rice farmers over water and land use.  
Hunsberger et al. found responses to climate change actually created land conflicts 
in Cambodia.45 Demand for biofuels and climate-resilient irrigation infrastructure reshaped 
social and ecological dynamics and changed patterns of land access. In many cases, these 
projects entered land already affected by concessions and past conflict, further 
disenfranchising rural citizens. Additionally, there has been growing concern over 
upstream hydropower development in Cambodia and its effect on the Mekong River, 
although any linkages to conflict have yet to be investigated.46 There were previous protests 
over a proposed upstream dam in Lao, and Cambodian civil society has been outspoken in 
its opposition to similar damming projects.47 
 
45 Carol Hunsberger, Courtney Work, and Roman Herre, “Linking Climate Change Strategies and Land 
Conflicts in Cambodia: Evidence from the Greater Aural Region,” World Development 108 (August 2018): 
309–20, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2018.02.008. 
46 Asia Times, “Asia Times | Mekong River Dying a Slow but Certain Death | Article,” Asia Times, 
accessed December 8, 2019, https://www.asiatimes.com/2019/12/article/mekong-river-dying-a-slow-but-
certain-death/. 
47 Rod Harbinson, “Cambodian Dam Proceeds despite Opposition over Fish, Ousted Villagers,” Mongabay 
Environmental News, 2015, https://news.mongabay.com/2015/08/cambodian-dam-proceeds-despite-
opposition-over-effects-on-fish-ousted-villagers/. 




Jacobson et al. found migration occurs in up to 45% of households in northwestern 
Cambodia, about half of which is climate-related.48 They found migration can cause labor 
shortages and welfare issues but may not necessarily improve food security. While they 
did not draw any conclusions about conflict, the study found migration is maladaptive over 
the long term, creating a climate-induced poverty trap. Other research has also found that 
Cambodians frequently migrate to find work, particularly to the border with Thailand.49 
Internal migration is far greater in scale than external migration -  nearly one quarter of the 
Cambodian population changed their location of residence in 2013.50 Storms near the Tonlé 
Sap Lake have also resulted in large migration, and surrounding provinces are likely to see 
future outflow due to climate change.51 
Bylander found that village reports of flood, drought, and rainfall deviations were 
associated with household out-migration in Cambodia.52 The report found associations 
between international migration and reported drought and poor rainfall during the previous 
year. The study found no association between reports of flooding and international 
migration. It should be noted that the researcher controlled for broad differences between 
villages but concluded that the evidence was not strong enough to suggest causal 
relationships between drought and migration. Finally, the study found that households in 
areas with nongovernmental organization agriculture programs were less likely to have 
migrant household members, suggesting potential policy responses. 
 
48 Chris Jacobson et al., “When Is Migration a Maladaptive Response to Climate Change?,” Regional 
Environmental Change 19, no. 1 (January 2019): 101–12, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-018-1387-6. 
49 Kimchoy Phong, Federico Barreras, and Javier Sola, “Internal Migration Patterns and Practices of Low-
Skilled and Unskilled Workers in Cambodia” (Open Institute, September 2016). 
50 UNDP, UNESCO, and UN Habitat, “Overview of Internal Migration in Cambodia,” n.d., 
https://bangkok.unesco.org/sites/default/files/assets/article/Social%20and%20Human%20Sciences/publicat
ions/Policy-brief-internal-migration-cambodia.pdf. 
51 UNDP, UNESCO, and UN Habitat. 
52 Maryann Bylander, “Cambodian Migration to Thailand: The Role of Environmental Shocks and Stress” 
(Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development, January 2016). 
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Chapter 3:  Methodology 
Despite its high exposure, limited quantitative research has been done on the 
security implications of climate change in Cambodia. Because of the country’s high 
dependence on agriculture and low adaptive capacity, conflict is most likely to occur due 
to agricultural loss and subsequent migration. These are driven by changes in water 
availability. However, Cambodia has experienced a decline in conflict incidence over the 
past several decades, likely due to its repressive government, and finding a definitive 




Figure 1: Provinces in Cambodia 
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The analysis focuses on Cambodia. Measures for preconditions, climate, and 
migration were explored country-wide. The provinces of Cambodia are shown in Figure 1. 
Provinces in Cambodia have a number of irregular spellings in different publications. For 




















Figure 2: Theoretical Framework 
The researcher developed the above theoretical framework for the purpose of this 
study. This research focuses on water and extremes and migration, indicated in the solid 
green circles. It discusses topics in the solid blue circles but does not analyze them in-
depth. The open blue circles are beyond the scope of this research. While food price spikes 
are an interesting source of conflict in the literature, they primarily affect urban democratic 
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methods to mitigate food price spikes in urban centers.53 Cambodia is still highly rural and 
authoritarian, so harvest losses and resulting migration pose a more salient security risk. 
The framework has three preconditions that are necessary but not sufficient for 
migration to occur due to agricultural losses: low adaptive capacity of the population, weak 
government social safety nets, and low perceptions of the government’s legitimacy. 
Combined with a high dependence on agriculture, these factors leave Cambodia vulnerable 
to climate-related security risks. In addition to those preconditions, a climate-related event 
involving extreme water abundance or scarcity must occur, leading to an increase in harvest 
losses and a corresponding increase in the odds of migration.  
Changes in the onset, duration, or intensity of the monsoon can have drastic 
consequences for smallholder farmers in rural Cambodia. There is relatively little 
technological innovation in Cambodia, and most agriculture relies on traditional wet-rice 
methods. These are highly dependent on the monsoonal floods, especially the flood-pulse 
system in the Tonlé Sap area. Excessive flooding can cause rice crops to rot and damage 
vegetable harvests while drought prevents farmers from planting in the first place or 
produces meager to no harvest. Drought also increases the risk in northwestern Cambodia, 
which is typically more arid than the wetter Tonlé Sap area.  
Only 23 percent of Cambodia’s GDP comes from agriculture, while 67 percent of 
the population is involved in agriculture in some capacity, indicating that many 
Cambodians are subsistence farmers.54 This high dependence on agriculture means that a 
large number of citizens’ livelihoods are bound up in farming. Climate shocks are more 
likely to result in widespread reductions in income and high levels of food insecurity.55 
 
53 Hendrix and Haggard, “Global Food Prices, Regime Type, and Urban Unrest in the Developing World.” 
54 “The World Bank in Cambodia,” September 25, 2019. 
55 Joshua Busby and Nina von Uexkull, “Climate Shocks and Humanitarian Crises,” September 25, 2019, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2018-11-29/climate-shocks-and-humanitarian-crises. 
 17 
Qualitative data suggest that harvest losses can lead rural populations to migrate for work 
which stresses finite government resources and ethnic fissure lines, leading to conflict. 
There is a growing body of research on climate migration, particularly in Southeast Asia, 
and so an analysis will be completed along with suggestions for future research. 
DATA SOURCES 
Preconditions 
All three preconditions are indicators of state fragility. Adaptive capacity is derived 
from household-level standards of living and wealth. This dataset comes from USAID’s 
Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS).56 The data were collected at a household level 
and contain measures for province (SHPROV) and rural vs. urban (HV025), which enables 
spatial analysis. This is important for identifying which provinces are at greatest risk. Data 
measures include whether a household has electricity (HV206), the number of hectares of 
agricultural land owned (HV245), whether the household owns livestock (HV246), 
whether any member of the household has a bank account (HV247), and a relative wealth 
index (HV270). The relative wealth index is a composite measure of a household’s 
cumulative living standard compared to living standards in the rest of the country.  
Government social safety net data are derived from the political, security, 
economic, and social effectiveness of the government. This includes components such as 
the quality of public service, presence of existing displaced populations, infant mortality 
rate, and poverty headcount, among others (Table 1). Government legitimacy comes from 
the political, security, economic, and social legitimacy of the government. These data 
include political participation, state use of political terror, control of corruption, and life 
 
56 ICF, “Demographic and Health Surveys (Various) [Dataset]. KHHR42DT, KHPR51FL, KHHR61DT, 
and KHHR73DT.” (Rockville, MD: Funded by USAID, 1998-2014). 
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expectancy (Table 1). The measures for government effectiveness and legitimacy are 
obtained from Kishi and Linke, 2016.57 The data is not disaggregated by province, but still 




Government Social Safety Net 
(Effectiveness) 
Government Legitimacy 
Political Quality of public service 
# of successful coups d’état in last 5 
years 
Gov’t tax revenue as a percent of GDP 
Competitiveness of political participation 
Citizen participation in selecting 
government 
Asylum requests as percent of population 
Security Intensity of ongoing armed conflict 
Size of displaced population 
Proportion of country affected by 
conflict 
State use of political terror 
Presence of militant groups against the 
state 
# of rivaling military organizations 
Economic GDP per capita 
Poverty headcount ratio 
Primary commodity exports as percent 
of total 
Control of corruption 
Rule of law and property rights 
protection 
# of days to start a business 
Social Infant mortality rate 
Child immunization rates 
% of population w/ access to improved 
water source 
Military expenditures as percent of GDP 
Percent of parliamentary seats held by 
women 
Life expectancy at birth 
Table 1: Indicators Used to Asses State Fragility58 
 Finally, the theoretical framework requires a high dependence on agriculture. Data 
on agriculture is derived from the Cambodian National Institute of Statistics’ (NIS) 
intercensal population survey. The format of Cambodian census data is inconsistent across 
years and publications, but a useable data file containing the employed population by 
occupation for 2013 was obtained from the CensusInfo Static Data Portal on the NIS 
 
57 Roudbeh Kishi and Andrew Linke, “Global Fragility Dataset,” 2016. 
58 Data from Ashley Moran et al., “The Intersection of Global Fragility and Climate Risks” (USAID, 
September 2018). 
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webpage.59 This was the only publicly available data that was disaggregated by province. 
The data provide information on the total number of people employed in skilled agriculture, 
fishery, and forestry. This was divided by the sum of all occupations to produce a percent 
of the total workers employed in agriculture.  
The primary crop in Cambodia is rice, and an additional dataset was used to identify 
critical agricultural production regions. The International Food Policy Research Institute’s 
Spatial Production Allocation Model (SPAM) estimates crop distribution within 
subnational grid cells.60 The dataset uses production statistics, land use data, and satellite 
imagery to provide information about the spatial distribution of crops. The data are 
disaggregated spatially and by crop. For this research, the raster data for rice production 
were clipped to the country extent to provide a measure of the land under production. 
Climate 
Moran et al. identified Cambodia as one of 15 states in the highest climate exposure 
and state fragility categories.61 Cambodia is vulnerable to climate effects through several 
climate hazards, including rising sea level infringing on the Mekong Delta, flood risks 
along vulnerable river and lake environments, potential for drought in water-dependent 
areas, and the conflation of these risks in population-dense areas (Table 2). Climate hazards 
expose large portions of the population and territory, which puts human health at risk and 
narrows potential livelihoods. Hazard exposure can also place extreme stress on limited 
state resources and capacity.  
 
 
59 “CensusInfo Static Page,” National Institute of Statistics, 2013, 
http://nis.gov.kh/nis/CensusInfo2.0/index.htm. 
60 “Globally Spatially-Disaggregated Crop Production Statistics Data for 2010 Version 1.1” (International 
Food Policy Research Institute, 2019). 
61 Moran et al., “The Intersection of Global Fragility and Climate Risks.” 
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Cambodia has low elevation across its coastal territory to the southwest 
in Koh Kong, Preah Sihanouk, Kampot, and Kep provinces. There is also 
low elevation along the Mekong River in Takeo, Prey Veng, Kandal, and 
Svay Rieng provinces, although it is limited to low-lying delta areas. 
Low-lying areas also line the Tonlé Sap River up to the Tonlé Sap Lake, 
affecting the eastern corner of Battambang province and southwestern 
corner of Siem Reap province. These areas are exposed to future sea 
level rise and associated flooding, storm surge, and saltwater intrusion. 
Sea level rise may also exacerbate monsoon season flooding, extending 
flood impacts further into the country and making valuable land 
unsuitable for agriculture. 
Cyclones63 Cambodia is not subject to cyclone risk. 
Floods63 
Cambodia is already flood-prone due to the seasonal monsoon flooding. 
This area is along the Mekong River, Tonlé Sap River, and Tonlé Sap 
Lake. During the wet season, water flows north through the Tonlé Sap 
River into the Tonlé Sap Lake, which expands and floods the 
surrounding area. The river flows back south during the dry season, 
creating an annual pattern of inundation. Most agriculture is dependent 
on the seasonal flooding and the flood-pulse system. Increased drought 
and/or sea level rise could change this flood pattern. 
Rainfall 
anomalies64 
Drought anomalies are predicted along the southeastern and northeastern 
sections of the country, according to some analyses. This will impact the 
already-vulnerable Mekong Delta and surrounding regions which are 
dependent on rainfall for agriculture. 
Chronic 
aridity64 
Cambodia has moderate chronic aridity throughout the country.  
Wildfires63 There is higher wildfire risk in the northeast quadrant of the country along the border with Vietnam in Mondul Kiri province. 
Table 2: Indicators Used to Assess Climate Exposure65 
 
62 Viewfinder Panoramas, “Digital Elevation Data,” n.d., http://viewfinderpanoramas.org/dem3.html. 
63 UNEP/GRID-Europe, “Global Risk Data Platform,” accessed May 30, 2019, 
https://preview.grid.unep.ch/index.php?preview=data&lang=eng. 
64 Udo Schneider et al., “GPCC Full Data Reanalysis Version 7.0 at 0.5°: Monthly Land-Surface 
Precipitation from Rain-Gauges Built on GTS-Based and Historic Data: Gridded Monthly Totals” (Global 
Precipitation Climatology Centre (GPCC) at Deutscher Wetterdienst, 2015), 
https://doi.org/10.5676/dwd_gpcc/fd_m_v7_050. 
65 Data from Moran et al., “The Intersection of Global Fragility and Climate Risks.” 
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The country is exposed to high risk for flooding and droughts, increased extreme 
events, and decreased agricultural production.66 While the overall population density is not 
high, the vast majority of people are concentrated in Phnom Penh, at an elevation of 39 feet 
and sits at the junction of the Mekong and Tonlé Sap Rivers, making it vulnerable to sea 
level rise and rainfall variability. Forty-five percent of the population (6.7 million people) 
reside in high exposure areas and about 20% of the population (3 million people) reside in 
very high exposure areas.67 An estimated 83% (12.5 million people) of the population faces 
above average hazard exposure. Forty-four percent (6.6 million) are more than 1 standard 
deviation above the mean regional exposure score and 16% are more than 2 standard 
deviations above.68  
 Given Cambodia’s high dependence on agriculture and vulnerability to rainfall 
anomalies, precipitation was chosen as the best proxy to understand climate trends over 
space and time. This research uses the Global Precipitation Climatology Project (GPCP) 
Version 2.3 as a measure for precipitation.69 This dataset was formatted to include over 
54,000 monthly observations locations from 2000 to 2019. The data were modified to 
exclude 2019 due to incomplete data for the year and to exclude latitude and longitude 
points over the Tonlé Sap Lake area which had no observations. The GPCP dataset 
integrates various satellite data with data from rain gauge stations to estimate monthly 
rainfall on a 2.5-degree global grid. 
 
66 O Hoegh-Guldberg et al., “Impacts of 1.5 C Global Warming on Natural and Human Systems,” in 
Global Warming of 1.5 C: An IPCC Special Report on the Impacts of Global Warming of 1.5 C above Pre-
Industrial Levels and Related Global Greenhouse Gas Emission Pathways, in the Context of Strengthening 
the Global Response to the Threat of Climate Change, Sustainable Development, and Efforts to Eradicate 
Poverty (Geneva, Switzerland, 2018). 
67 Moran et al., “The Intersection of Global Fragility and Climate Risks.” 
68 Juhi Amodwala, “Cambodia,” Country Mini-Brief (Strauss Center Brumley Next Generation Fellows 
Program, April 2018). 
69 Robert Adler et al., “The Version 2.3 Global Precipitation Climatology Project (GPCP) Monthly 
Precipitation Analysis (1979-Present),” n.d. 
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Figure 3 shows the distribution of all precipitation observations between 2000 and 
2018 for each latitude and longitude point. The distribution of total observations is 
polynomial and thus cannot be analyzed using traditional parametric models. Parametric 
modelling methods, such as linear regression, require certain distributions and known 
parameters. The distribution is also bimodal, with one mode around 0 mm during the dry 
season and one around 250mm during the wet season. 
 
 
Figure 3: Distribution of Precipitation Observations70 
Figure 4 shows the distribution of yearly precipitation means which were calculated 
by averaging monthly precipitation data from January to December annually for each 
latitude and longitude pair. The distribution of yearly precipitation means follows a 
Gaussian distribution with a long right tail. Figure 5 shows the measures for mean and 
 
70 Data from Adler et al. 
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central tendency. The data have a mean of 176.51 and median of 172.26, supporting the 
conclusion that the data is right-skewed. The standard deviation is 41.58, indicating some 
variation between years. 
 
 
Figure 4: Distribution of Yearly Precipitation Means71 
 
Figure 5: Measures of Mean and Central Tendency for Yearly Means71 
While the distribution of yearly means is normal, examining them over time yields 
an interesting pattern (Figure 6). Each dot represents a yearly mean at a single latitude-
longitude point. The y-axis is the value of the yearly mean, in mm. The x-axis is the year. 
 
71 Data from Adler et al. 
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While there has been some oscillation over time, the means for 2000-2015 are tightly 
clustered while the means for 2016-2018 are widely dispersed. The 2016-2018 dispersion 
is greater for large means, but still exists for smaller ones. 
 
 
Figure 6: Scatterplot of Yearly Means over Time72 
 The measures of dispersion and central tendency support the visual results from the 
scatterplot (Figures 7 and 8). The data for 2000-2015 have a mean of 174.33 and median 
of 172.54, indicating a slight right skew. The standard deviation is 24.23, indicating that 
the means are tightly clustered. However, the data for 2016-2018 differ – the mean is 
188.13 and the median is 169.64, indicating a significant right skew and higher mean. The 
standard deviation is 87.57, indicating that the data are far more dispersed during those 
years than the previous 15 years. 
 




Figure 7: Measures of Dispersion and Central Tendency for 2000-201573 
 
Figure 8: Measures of Dispersion and Central Tendency for 2016-201873 
Migration 
Migration data were parsed together from multiple data sources including 
qualitative and quantitative data. The primary sources were focus group interviews, reports, 
and existing studies. 
The focus group interviews were conducted in January 2019 in Battambang 
province by the researcher in order to elucidate migration and security trends. They were 
conducted with the help of a translator from a local development non-governmental 
organization called Aphivat Strey. Aphivat Strey works with the Cambodia Development 
Resources Institute (CDRI) to implement climate resiliency and poverty reduction 
development projects. The survey consisted of 35 questions divided into segments on 
climate change, adaptation, and security risks (Appendix B). The researcher interviewed 
24 residents in three focus groups over the course of two days. Each focus group took 
approximately three hours. This research did not require Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
approval (Appendix C). The focus groups will be elaborated on in the qualitative analysis 
and results sections. 
 
73 Data from Adler et al. 
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There is some literature on migration in Cambodia, although the majority of it 
consists of research reports rather than scientific studies. These primarily come from the 
International Organization for Migration, USAID, the United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs, the World Bank, OECD, and other partner organizations. 
However, the majority of these sources only had country-level data. A critical source of 
quantitative analysis came from a 2016 study by Maryann Bylander on Cambodian 
migration to Thailand.74 This research uses these reports to construct an assessment of the 
existing patterns of migration in Cambodia and how those patterns are related to climate 
effects.  
QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 
 A mixed analysis was completed for the theoretical framework’s preconditions: 
adaptive capacity, government social safety net, and government legitimacy. The analysis 
used a combination of quantitative data measures examined over time, literature-based 
knowledge about political, social, and economic conditions, and mapping software to 
visualize conditions.  
Adaptive capacity data came from USAID’s Demographic and Health Surveys 
(DHS) for the years 2000, 2005, 2010, and 2014 and were analyzed in Stata.75 Whether a 
household has electricity (HV206), whether the household owns livestock (HV246), 
whether the any member of the household has a bank account (HV247), and whether the 
household owns land usable for agriculture (HV244) were already coded in a general 
format where 0 indicated ‘no’ and 1 indicated ‘yes’. The relative wealth index (HV270) 
was already coded where ‘poorest,’ ‘poorer,’ ‘middle,’ ‘richer,’ and ‘richest’ were on a 
 
74 Bylander, “Cambodian Migration to Thailand: The Role of Environmental Shocks and Stress.” 
75 ICF, “Demographic and Health Surveys (Various) [Dataset]. KHHR42DT, KHPR51FL, KHHR61DT, 
and KHHR73DT.” (Rockville, MD: Funded by USAID, 1998-2014). 
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scale from 1 to 5, respectively. The summary of each variable for each year was tabulated 
by province in Stata, producing a table with the mean, standard deviation, and count of the 
respective variable for each province.  
The correlation between each variable was analyzed to determine which, if any, 
were redundant and already incorporated in the relative wealth index measure (Figure 9). 
Access to electricity and possession of livestock were both highly correlated, although in 
different directions. Access to a bank account was moderately correlated but was lacking 
data from 2005. Because the relative wealth index includes components such as ownership 
of certain assets, materials used for construction, and access to water and other facilities, 
the highly correlated variables were removed.  
 
 
Figure 9: Correlation of DHS Variables76 
Ultimately, only access to agricultural land was used to measure adaptative 
capacity. The relative wealth index separates households within the country into quintiles. 
 
76 Data from ICF. 
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Since Cambodia is a least developed country, the relative wealth is still low compared to 
global standard of living and the measure does not provide particularly useful information. 
The final variable was then analyzed in ArcGIS for trends in temporal or spatial variation.  
Measures for government social safety net and government legitimacy were taken 
from Kishi and Linke’s Global Fragility Dataset.77 The indicators are compiled using open-
source data to create a measure of state fragility, which assesses effectiveness and 
legitimacy in political, security, economic, and social spheres. The dataset contains 
indicators for each subcategory for the years 2000-2014. In order to assess overall change, 
the percent change was calculated for each subcategory between 2000 and 2014. 
Additionally, the indicators were compared to the global average to assess relative fragility. 
The indicators for government social safety net and legitimacy are from 2014. 
While the data is older than preferred, this was found acceptable for a number of reasons. 
First, the data are used to establish the preconditions rather than the full analysis. Second, 
the data provide a comprehensive index that is difficult to find elsewhere. Additionally, 
updating the data is also not feasible. There are 12 indicators that make up each index. 
While some of those indicators have updated data, some of them do not. Additionally, the 
process used to make each index is not necessarily replicable within the scope of this 
research. Finally, the data have likely not changed meaningfully given Cambodia’s 
repressive political system and continued reliance on foreign aid. The details of each 
indicator are analyzed in the results section. 
Following the analysis of climate data, described in the next section, a mixed 
analysis of the migration data was completed. This had two components: a series of focus 
groups conducted by the researcher and an analysis based on existing reports. The focus 
 
77 Moran et al., “The Intersection of Global Fragility and Climate Risks.” 
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groups were conducted prior to the climate analysis to elucidate trends and concerns of 
community members about climate risks and exposure. The surveys were conducted in 
January of 2019 and had a set of 35 questions divided in three segments: climate change, 
adaptation, and security concerns (Appendix B). The questions were developed by the 
researcher and edited and translated by a project manager at Aphivat Strey.  
Three focus groups were conducted in communes in Battambang province with the 
researcher, project manager (who acted as a translator), and group members. Battambang 
is in Northwestern Cambodia and was chosen for its proximity to the Thai border and Tonlé 
Sap Lake. It was also chosen for convenience due to the presence of English-speaking 
research and development organizations. The communes were Ta Pon (January 2), Prek 
Luong (January 3), and Rohal Suong (January 3). All members of the focus groups were 
rural smallholder farmers, though some held additional jobs at the local markets. The focus 
groups at Ta Pon and Prek Luong consisted solely of female members of Aphivat Strey’s 
women’s empowerment program. The focus group at Rohal Suong was a mixed-gender 
group of smallholder farmers from a climate-smart village program implemented by CDRI 
and the Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research (CGIAR).  
The female focus groups consisted of 10 members while the climate-smart group 
consisted of 4 members. The members of the groups had above-average knowledge of 
climate change and its risks. Each focus group survey took approximately three hours with 
the help of a guide and translator. Questions were asked sequentially with the help of the 
translator, and responses were translated and recorded on paper. Following the interviews, 
the researcher transcribed the notes on Microsoft OneDrive and added a summary of the 
group interactions. The objective of the focus groups was to gather qualitative data on 
community-level views on climate change, household adaptive capacity, and potential 
security risks. 
 30 
Additional data were acquired from research reports and scientific studies. The 
information in the reports was used to create a holistic picture of past migration trends in 
Cambodia as well as to predict future trends and factors motivating migration. A number 
of the reports directly assessed the relationship between climate change and migration.  
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
A quantitative analysis was completed for the precipitation data to elucidate 
spatiotemporal trends. Given that the distribution of all observations follows a polynomial 
pattern, parametric modeling such as regression analysis is not the best approach. 
Additionally, the data exhibits significant spatial variation. A regression of precipitation 
on time would be inappropriate given the extensive country-wide variation – any such 
model would obscure spatial variation and fail to adequately assess temporal variation. 
Even after aggregating the data by year, a regression of yearly means on time would still 
be inappropriate given the extensive variation in means as shown in Figure 6. In order to 
adequately assess variation, a regression analysis would have to regress each individual 
latitude-longitude point on time, which would be time-intensive. Additionally, an analysis 
of z-scores that compared each individual observation to that month’s average would be 
inappropriate because the assumptions underlying z tests do not hold.  
In order to properly assess variation in the data across space and time, the data were 
analyzed using the Emerging Hot Spot Analysis (EHSA) tool on ArcGIS. The tool analyses 
trends in spatiotemporal high and low values. The tool first requires a 3-dimensional space-
time cube which compiles the precipitation data into yearly latitude-longitude bins (Figure 
10), then the EHSA tool completes two statistical analyses: (1) the Getis-Ord Gi* statistic 
and (2) the Mann-Kendall trend test. Both analyses evaluate spatiotemporal patterns. The 
analysis was completed twice: once for all data, and once for rainy season data. 
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 To create the space-time cube, the data were added to ArcGIS as a csv file and then 
converted into x,y data using the data’s latitude and longitudinal measures. The x,y data 
used a geographic coordinate system but the tool required a projected coordinate system, 
so the data were converted to a Web Mercator projection. The data were then entered into 
the Create Space Time Cube by Aggregating Points tool.78 The tool produced a three-
dimensional netCDF file that contained measures for the sum, mean, and count of all 
observations for each bin (Figure 10 – x is longitude, y is latitude, each time slice is one 
year, and the time series extends from 2000 to 2018). This method created a right-skewed 
normal distribution of yearly means and sums, enabling the data to be analyzed by a Getis-
Ord Gi* statistic.  
 
 
Figure 10: Visualization of a Space-Time Cube79 
 
78 To replicate this study, the data were aggregated into fishnet bins with a distance of 28,620 meters and a 
time step of one year. 
79 Figure from ESRI. 
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 Once the space-time cube was created, the Emerging Hot Spot Analysis tool 
analyzed spatiotemporal patterns. The Getis-Ord Gi* statistic measures clustering of high 
or low values in a bin and its neighbors in the space-time cube.80 Neighboring bins exist in 
time and space due to the three-dimensional nature of the cube. The sum of a bin and its 
neighbors is compared proportionally to the sum of all bins. If the observed sum is different 
from the expected value, and that observed sum is too large to be the result of random 
chance, the tool produces a statistically significant z-score. The tool produces a z-score and 
p-value for each bin where there is statistically significant clustering of high or low values 
compared to neighboring bins and to the overall country. Larger absolute value z-scores 
indicate more intense clustering of high or low values.  
 Once the Getis-Ord Gi* statistic is produced, the tool uses the Mann-Kendall 
statistic to test whether a statistically significant temporal monotonic trend exists in each 
bin’s 18-year time series of z-scores.81 A monotonic trend means that the variable 
consistently increases or decreases, but the scale of change does not need to be linear. 
Additionally, the Mann-Kendall test is a non-parametric rank order correlation test, 
meaning it can be used for all distributions. This is appropriate for precipitation data, which 
vary widely due to complex climatic systems. However, data cannot be aggregated 
seasonally, because the large positive value of a rainy season would oppose the small value 
of a dry season, resulting in a value of 0 and no pattern.  
The Mann-Kendall statistic is calculated for each bin time series. Each later-
measured bin is compared to all bins preceding it, resulting in a total of n(n-1)/2 possible 
 
80 Arthur Getis and J. K. Ord, “The Analysis of Spatial Association by Use of Distance Statistics,” 
Geographical Analysis 24, no. 3 (September 3, 2010): 189–206, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1538-
4632.1992.tb00261.x. 
81 Henry B. Mann, “Nonparametric Tests Against Trend,” Econometrica 13, no. 3 (July 1945): 245, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/1907187. 
    Maurice G. Kendall and Jean Dickinson Gibbons, Rank Correlation Methods, 5th ed (London: New 
York, NY: E. Arnold; Oxford University Press, 1990). 
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pairs of bins, where n is the total number of bins. For each pair of bins, a value of -1, 0, or 
1 is assigned. If the z-score of the later bin is larger than the preceding, the result is a +1 
(increasing trend). If the z-score of the later bin is smaller than the preceding, the result is 
a -1 (decreasing trend). If the later bin is no different from the preceding, the result is 0 (no 
trend). Each pair of bins is summed over the 18-year time series; the expected sum of the 
bins is zero, indicating no trend in the values over time. In this analysis, the test compares 
the final bin, year 2018, to all preceding bins for a single latitude-longitude point, assigning 
each a score of -1, 0, or 1. It then does this for 2017, and 2016, and so on. These values are 
summed, and a z-score and p-value are calculated for each bin time series. A positive 
Mann-Kendall statistic indicates an upward trend while negative values indicate a 
downward trend.  
The cluster and trend results from the Getis-Ord Gi* and Mann-Kendall tests are 
then used to categorize each bin. The EHSA tool uses both the Mann-Kendall z-score and 
the percent of the time series that was a hot or cold spot to categorize the bin, which results 
in seventeen possible categories. In this analysis, a “trend” indicates a temporal change in 
a general direction (i.e. a drying trend) while “pattern” indicates a repeated arrangement 
(i.e. an oscillating pattern). The phrases “hot spot,” “cold spot,” and “cluster” indicate a 
group of similar things that are near each other. Cold spots indicate statistically significant 
clusters of low precipitation while hot spots indicate statistically significant clusters of high 
precipitation.  
Essentially, the EHSA analyzed the data across the country for each individual time 
slice and then across time for each individual latitude-longitude point. First, it analyzed the 
country-wide precipitation data for a single year using the Getis-Ord Gi* test. For example, 
the test would first analyze the precipitation data for the year 2000, bin by bin, and 
determine if there were clusters of high and low precipitation in the country compared to 
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the expected value. Then, the Mann-Kendall test took those results and compared them for 
a single latitude-longitude point over time. For example, the test would analyze all years 
for the latitude and longitude 103.125, 13.875 to determine if there was a trend. This 
approach to three-dimensional data, by first analyzing horizontal slices and then analyzing 

















Chapter 4:  Results 
POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS 
Low Adaptive Capacity 
Adaptive capacity is derived from standards of living, wealth, and assets. Cambodia 
is one of the United Nation’s Least Developed Countries with a Human Development Index 
rank of 146 out of 189.82 According to 2014 DHS data, ~ 32% of children under 5 were 
stunted, indicating poor nutrition.83 About 25% of the population does not have access to 
improved water and 44% do not have access to improved sanitation.84  
The country has very little income generating activities and remains highly 
dependent on aid from bilateral and multilateral donors. Between 2000 and 2013, 
Cambodia received $11.8 billion in foreign aid.85 Development assistance constitutes 4% 
of GDP and 30% of the government budget.86 At the household level, the average gross 
national income per capita was $1,390 USD in 2018.87 As of 2014, 18% of the population 
was living below the national poverty line, and ~ 90% of the country’s poor live in rural 
areas.88 
Agricultural land is a key resource for rural smallholder famers due to its role as an 
income generator and asset. However, the DHS data for agricultural land ownership shows 
a disparate ownership of resources across space (Figure 11). 
 
82 UNDP, “Human Development Index (HDI),” accessed May 30, 2019, 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi. 
83 ICF, “Demographic and Health Surveys (Various) [Dataset]. KHHR42DT, KHHR51DT, KHHR61DT, 
and KHHR73DT.” 
84 “The World Bank in Cambodia.” 
85 “AidData,” n.d., http://dashboard.aiddata.org/#/advanced/project-list. 
86 World Bank, “Cambodia | Data.” 
87 World Bank. 
88 “The World Bank in Cambodia.”  
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Figure 11: Percent of Population with Agricultural Land89 
 
89 Data from ICF 
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The spatial data in Figure 11 indicate a decline over time in the percent of 
respondents that own agricultural land. While the decline may indicate that people are 
moving to cities and finding employment in sectors other than agriculture, the trend could 
also be more problematic. It may be that households are losing land due to economic 
concessions to private agribusiness companies.90 Households may also be unable to afford 
their land or must sell it to provide for their families. Regardless, the loss of land is 
concerning – property ownership is a critical asset for rural families and communities.   
Weak Government Social Safety Net 
Cambodia has made improvements in addressing government effectiveness (Table 
3 – represented by declining values). Effectiveness indicators assess the capacity of 
government institutions and practices, including the quality of public service, proportion 
of country affected by conflict, poverty headcount ratio, and infant mortality rate. In 
particular, the country improved its social effectiveness scores. These scores are largely 
from improvements in health and wellbeing, as well as the provision of social services. 



















     38%      33% - -      60% 
2014 score 13 4 2 3 4 
2000 score 21 6 2 3 10 
Table 3: Government Effectiveness in Cambodia91 
 
90 “Concessions,” Open Development Cambodia (ODC) (blog), accessed April 15, 2020, 
https://opendevelopmentcambodia.net/topics/concessions/. 
91 Data from Kishi and Linke, “Global Fragility Dataset.” 
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Measures of social effectiveness include infant mortality rate, child immunization 
rates, and percent of population with access to improved water sources. Cambodia’s 
improved social effectiveness stems from increased ability to deliver quality healthcare and 
other public goods, which has led directly to an increased vaccination rate and decreased 
infant mortality rate. The Ministry of Health established the National Immunization 
Programme in 2000, achieving significant results in the time since its initiation. Cambodia 
has been polio-free since 2000, achieved measles elimination in 2015, and maternal and 
neonatal tetanus elimination in 2015.92 Cambodia has also achieved significant reductions 
in infant mortality rates. In 2000, the infant mortality rate was 79.6 per 1000 live births, far 
above the global average of 53.6. By 2014, that was reduced to 28.9 per 1000 live births, 
below the global average of 31.2.93  
In all other effectiveness measures, however, Cambodia remains a relatively fragile 
state. While Cambodia’s political effectiveness and social effectiveness scores have 
improved, they are still worse than global averages. Additionally, Cambodia had no 
improvement in security or economic effectiveness scores, which are also worse than 
global averages. Combined, these high scores indicate greater fragility. Notably, the 
political effectiveness score shows the greatest deviation from the global average. This is 
likely due to a combination of inadequate tax revenue to fund line ministries and a civil 
service too intertwined with the political process to provide effective government service. 
Consequently, the ability of the government to provide public services and resources to its 
citizens is worse than the global average, despite improvements from 2000 to 2014.  
 
92 World Health Organization, “WPRO | Expanded Programme on Immunization,” WPRO, accessed May 
30, 2019, http://www.wpro.who.int/cambodia/areas/immunization/en/. 
93 World Bank, “Cambodia | Data.” 
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Low Government Legitimacy 
Cambodia experienced a rapid decrease in legitimacy between 2000 and 2014 
(represented by an increase in scores). Legitimacy indicators assess the degree of public 
support for government institutions and officials. The majority of those legitimacy deficits 
lie in the political legitimacy and economic legitimacy scores (Table 4). These poor scores 
stem largely from the lack of political freedom and increasing control of the CPP as well 
as the lack of economic growth despite heavy external investment.94 Many of these issues 
are rooted in Cambodia’s complex history and the deepening of political control by the 



















     39%      80% -      33%      33% 
2014 score 25 9 4 8 4 
2000 score 18 5 4 6 3 
Table 4: Government Legitimacy in Cambodia95 
After escaping the brutal Khmer Rouge regime in 1979, the country built a 
governance system from the destruction left in the regime’s wake. After signing the Paris 
Peace Agreement in 1991, Cambodia developed a proto-democratic system under the 
oversight of the United Nations. The UN lacked enforcement mechanisms, however, and 
the Khmer Rouge maintained political power via its seat at the UN. Eventually, current 
prime minister Hun Sen took office after several decades of vying for power. He has 
retained control since 1985, with frequent allegations of electoral fraud, corruption, 
 
94 Sophal Ear, Aid Dependence in Cambodia: How Foreign Assistance Undermines Democracy (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2013). 
95 Data from Kishi and Linke, “Global Fragility Dataset.” 
 40 
intimidation, and elimination of opposition parties.96 Hun Sen is one of the world’s longest-
serving prime ministers.  
Hun Sen and his political party, the Cambodia Peoples’ Party (CPP) has incredible 
reach and power across the country. Most villages and communes have a CPP office or 
two, even in remote areas. CPP officials work with village leaders to manage and verify 
elections, increasing the reach and power of the party to local-level elections and processes. 
The CPP regularly arrests or exiles institutions, political parties, and individuals that 
threaten its control.  
The CPP elite structure is predicated on the exchange of political privileges and 
backing for financial contributions and loyalty to the CPP, with CPP officials distributing 
opportunities for fundraising to government officials.97 Cambodia has a strong culture of 
neopatrimonialism in which state officials often secure the loyalty of individuals and 
municipal officials through complex informal webs of patronage.98 This system leads to 
wealth-accumulation networks which encourage graft and aid-dependence in the 
Cambodia bureaucracy. Individuals often use aid money to fund their personal lifestyles 
and secure loyalty from those down the network. Similarly, the loyalty of business tycoons 
is managed through public contracts, monopolies, and land concessions. The 
neopatrimonial system has created a cemented elite that control the regulatory and political 
system for their benefit rather than the benefit of the Cambodian people. 
The CPP has implemented a number of policies to eliminate opposition and 
consolidate power. Following the 2003 elections, Hun Sen placed loyalists in key positions 
 
96 “Cambodia: Crackdown Crushes Media, Opposition,” Human Rights Watch, January 18, 2018, 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/01/18/cambodia-crackdown-crushes-media-opposition. 
97 International Institute for Asian Studies, “Politics and Society in Contemporary Cambodia,” accessed 
May 30, 2019, https://iias.asia/the-newsletter/article/politics-society-contemporary-cambodia. 
98 Pak Kimchoeun et al., Accountability and Neo-Patrimonialism in Cambodia: A Critical Literature 
Review, Working Paper 34 (Phnom Penh: Cambodia Development Resource Institute, 2007). 
 41 
and began expanding state, business, and military power and developing a patronage 
system. The army currently has an estimated 3000 generals (three times more than the US 
army), while the number of honorary titles bestowed on businessmen has increased from 
20 in 2004 to 700 in 2014.99 Key agencies, such as the Anti-Corruption Unit (ACU), 
operate as enforcers for the CPP and have targeted opposition leaders Sam Rainsy and Kem 
Sokha.100 The killings of garment sector unionist Chea Vichea in 2004, environmentalist 
Chut Wutty in 2012, and government critic Kem Ley in 2016 were likely politically 
motivated.101 
In 1997, the CCP passed the Law on Political Parties to manage the legality and 
regulation of political parties. In 2017 the CCP amended the law to pave the way for the 
regime to ban opposition leaders for five years.102 The CPP also periodically amends and 
passes legislation restricting civil rights such as press freedom and freedom of movement. 
This consolidation of power and crackdown on dissent has coincided with fewer protests 
and lower conflict, largely due to the tightening of restrictions on peaceful protests. This 
has allowed Hun Sen to retain power unchallenged since the 2000s and fully consolidate 
power in the CPP during the most recent election.  
While 20 parties participated in the most recent election, the CCP banned the 
primary opposition party Cambodia National Rescue Party and recently formed Cambodia 
 
99 Mech Dara, “Government Approves 56 Additional Generals, National, Phnom Penh Post,” accessed 
May 30, 2019, https://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/government-approves-56-additional-generals. 
     Sek Odom, “As Oknha Ranks Grow, Honorific Loses Meaning,” The Cambodia Daily, June 21, 2014, 
https://www.cambodiadaily.com/news/as-oknha-ranks-grow-honorific-loses-meaning-62057/. 
100 International Institute for Asian Studies, “Politics and Society in Contemporary Cambodia.” 
101 International Institute for Asian Studies. 
102 Ben Sokhean, “Assembly Passes Amendment to Political Party Law Article 45,” Phnom Penh Post, 
accessed May 30, 2019, https://www.phnompenhpost.com/national-politics/assembly-passes-amendment-
political-party-law-article-45. 
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National Rescue Movement.103 In order to prove their legitimacy, the CPP had local 
officials record the names of villagers that did not vote and allegedly threatened to withhold 
public services.104 Without their primary opposition on the ballot, the Cambodia Peoples 
Party took all 125 seats of the National Assembly with a reported 83% voter turnout, further 
consolidating its hold on the nation.105 
High Dependence on Agriculture 
A high level of dependence on agriculture is if at least 40% of the country’s 
population works in agriculture.106 About 67% of Cambodia’s population is involved in 
agriculture, meeting that threshold. However, only 23.4% of GDP comes from agriculture 
and it is not a significant income-generating activity.107 Many of those involved in 
agriculture are poor smallholder farmers who rely on their crops for subsistence.  
The distribution of agricultural involvement is not equal across the country (Figure 
12). The data in the figure shows the percentage of respondents (employed persons) who 
are employed in agriculture. The provinces of Phnom Penh, Preah Sihanouk, Kandal, Koh 
Kong, Siem Reap, and Battambang are less dependent on agriculture due to the presence 
of a large city or other employment opportunities (usually related to coastal tourism and 
 
103 Prak Chan Thul, “Cambodia’s Ruling Party Won All Seats in July Vote: Election Commission,” 
Reuters, August 15, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cambodia-election/cambodias-ruling-party-
won-all-seats-in-july-vote-election-commission-idUSKBN1L01E7. 
104 “Authorities Threaten to Withhold Public Services If Villagers Don’t Vote For Cambodia’s Ruling 
Party,” Radio Free Asia, accessed May 30, 2019, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/cambodia/threats-
07172018164210.html. 
105 “Hun Sen’s CPP Wins All Parliamentary Seats in Cambodia Election,” accessed May 29, 2019, 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/08/hun-sen-cpp-wins-parliamentary-seats-cambodia-election-
180815135109639.html. 
106 Busby and Uexkull, “Climate Shocks and Humanitarian Crises.” 
      Judith M. Bretthauer, “Conditions for Peace and Conflict: Applying a Fuzzy-Set Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis to Cases of Resource Scarcity,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 59, no. 4 (June 
2015): 593–616, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002713516841. 
107 World Bank, “Cambodia | Data.” 
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poorer agricultural conditions). Nearly two-thirds of the provinces have agricultural 
involvement rates higher than the country-wide average of 67%, indicating that the 
livelihoods of rural Cambodians are likely to be connected to agricultural sector.  
 
 
Figure 12: Percent of Employed Population in Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing108 
The primary crop in Cambodia is rice, although many communities also rely on 
vegetables, cassava, and maize production.109 Rice production is highly susceptible to 
changes in rainfall because most of the country remains reliant on wet-rice agriculture and 
lacks irrigation systems.110 The wet season typically lasts from June to November and 
 
108 Data from “Cambodia Inter-Censal Population Survey 2013: Final Report” (National Institute of 
Statistics, Ministry of Planning, November 2013). 
109 “Cambodia - Agricultural Sector,” August 6, 2019, 
https://www.export.gov/apex/article2?id=Cambodia-Agricultural-Sector. 
110 “Cambodia - Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing,” Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed March 15, 2020, 
https://www.britannica.com/place/Cambodia. 
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farmers typically plant their primary crop in June-July and harvest in November-January. 
Farmers produce rice for household consumption and to sell at markets. Therefore, 
smallholder farmers are highly vulnerable to rainfall changes that affect rice production. 
Certain regions of the country are better for rice agriculture due to natural 
topography and climate systems. These areas are clustered in two regions: around Tonlé 
Sap Lake, where the topography is flat and rice agriculture can use the lake’s flood pulse 
system for water, and the Mekong River, where water is readily available (Figure 13).111 
 
 
Figure 13: Spatial Distribution of Rice Production112 
 
111 Mary Beth Day et al., “Middle to Late Holocene Initiation of the Annual Flood Pulse in Tonle Sap 
Lake, Cambodia,” Journal of Paleolimnology 45, no. 1 (January 2011): 85–99, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10933-010-9482-9. 
112 Data from “Globally Spatially-Disaggregated Crop Production Statistics Data for 2010 Version 1.1.” 
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PRECIPITATION TRENDS 
The Emerging Hot Spot Analysis tool produces seventeen categories covering a 
range of scenarios. These categories are based on the percent of time that a bin time series 
was a hot spot or cold spot and the Mann-Kendall z-score. In order to reduce distractions 
from the mapped results, all categories without results were removed. Additionally, the 
colors were inverted from the default output to best visualize precipitation results – red 
colors represent region of low precipitation, or a cold spot. Blue colors represent a region 
of high precipitation, or a hot spot. The categories are explained in Table 5.  
 
Hot Spot Pattern  Description 
Consecutive Hot Spot 
 
A location with a single uninterrupted run of statistically significant 
hot spot bins in the final time-step intervals. The location has never 
been a statistically significant prior to the final hot spot run and less 
than ninety percent of all bins are statistically significant hot spots. 
Sporadic Hot Spot
 
A location that is an on-again then off-again hot spot. Less than 
ninety percent of the time-step intervals have been statistically 
significant hot spots and none of the time-step intervals have been 
statistically significant cold spots. 
Oscillating Hot Spot 
 
A statistically significant hot spot for the final time-step interval that 
has a history of also being a statistically significant cold spot during 
a prior time step. Less than ninety percent of the time-step intervals 
have been statistically significant hot spots. 
Consecutive Cold Spot 
 
A location with a single uninterrupted run of statistically significant 
cold spot bins in the final time-step intervals. The location has never 
been a statistically significant cold spot prior to the final run and less 
than ninety percent of all bins are statistically significant cold spots. 
Intensifying Cold Spot 
 
A location that has been a statistically significant cold spot for ninety 
percent of the time-step intervals, including the final time step. In 
addition, the intensity of clustering of low counts in each time step is 
increasing overall and that increase is statistically significant. 
Table 5: Hot Spot Analysis Patterns113 
 
113 “How Emerging Hot Spot Analysis Works—ArcGIS Help | Documentation,” accessed February 2, 
2020, https://pro.arcgis.com/en/pro-app/tool-reference/space-time-pattern-mining/learnmoreemerging.htm. 
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Sporadic Cold Spot 
 
A location that is an on-again then off-again cold spot. Less than 
ninety percent of the time-step intervals have been statistically 
significant cold spots and none of the time-step intervals have been 
statistically significant hot spots. 
Oscillating Cold Spot 
 
A statistically significant cold spot for the final time-step interval that 
has a history of also being a statistically significant hot spot during a 
prior time step. Less than ninety percent of the time-step intervals 
have been statistically significant cold spots. 
No Pattern Detected 
 
Does not fall into any of the hot or cold spot patterns defined above 
Table 5, continued. 
The data are contained in a cube similar to the example in Figure 14 (not derived 
from this analysis). Each latitude-longitude-year bin contains a z-score indicating whether 
it is a hot or cold spot. Larger absolute values indicate a greater deviation from the expected 
value and appear as deeper red or blue. These are then compared over time to determine 
the pattern and trend, as described in the methodology section.  
 
 
Figure 14: Space-Time Cube Representation114 
 
114 Figure from Varun Adibhatla, “Space-Time Hotspot Analysis from ESRI,” Threader, accessed April 15, 
2020, https://threader.app/thread/1162756909008654336. 
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The output map (Figure 15) shows the eight categories included in the results.115 
The analysis was completed for yearly means and rainy season means, but the output 
showed little variation between the two. While rice is produced more intensely in the wet 
season, it is a year-round crop.116 Thus, the output map for yearly means was chosen.  
 
 
Figure 15: Emerging Hot Spot Analysis for Precipitation117 
 
115 A visualization of the hot spot results over time is available at the following link: 
https://youtu.be/bu8H2hzikkg 
116 “Commodity Intelligence Report,” USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, 2013, 
https://ipad.fas.usda.gov/highlights/2013/11/Cambodia/. 
117 Data from Adler et al. 
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The Emerging Hot Spot Analysis (EHSA) results show significant spatial variation 
(Figure 15). The southwest and eastern portions of the country have experienced sporadic 
periods of increasing precipitation, although these results do not indicate a statistically 
significant trend. The northwest region has several consecutive and intensifying cold spots 
that are statistically significant, indicating that clusters of low precipitation in recent time 
periods have been the norm and have, in fact, been deepening. This is significant for 
agricultural losses and potential migration.  
The northeast and southwest regions of the country have similar results, including 
sporadic hot spots, oscillating hot spots, and consecutive hot spots. This includes the 
provinces of Ratanak Kiri and Stung Treng in the northeast and Koh Kong, Preah 
Sihanouk, Kampot, Pursat, and Kampot in the southwest. The sporadic hot spots indicate 
on-again-off-again periods of high precipitation relative to the expected value. The 
oscillating hot spots indicate high precipitation in the final time-step interval and the 
presence of a previous cold spot. The consecutive hot spot bin indicates consecutive years 
of high precipitation in the final time-step. These results do not necessarily indicate an 
increasing trend. The Mann-Kendall z-scores for these regions are not statistically 
significant and the percent of time the bins were a hot spot is low. There is a similar pattern 
in the eastern provinces of Kratie, Tboung Khmum, Kampong Cham, and the southern 
portion of Mondul Kiri. While these trends are interesting, they do not indicate increasing 
clusters of precipitation over time.  
 The results for the northwest region of the country, including Battambang, Banteay 
Meanchey, Oddar Meanchey, Siem Reap, and some areas around Tonlé Sap Lake reveal a 
trend of decreasing precipitation in the region (Figure 16). The majority of the area is a 
sporadic cold spot, indicating on-again and off-again clusters of low precipitation. These 
bins were cold spots between 10% and 84% of the time, and all except one have a 
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statistically significant Mann-Kendall z-score, demonstrating a decreasing trend. 
Additionally, there is a region in Banteay Meanchey and Siem Reap provinces with 
consecutive and intensifying cold spots. The consecutive cold spots indicate that all the 
final time-step intervals are statistically significant clusters of low precipitation compared 
to the expected value based on country-wide temporal neighbors. These bins were cold 
spots 89% of the time and all have statistically significant negative Mann-Kendall z-scores, 
demonstrating a decreasing trend. The intensifying cold spots indicate that the majority of 
the time-step intervals were statistically significant clusters of low precipitation and the 
clustering of low counts in each time step is increasing overall. These bins were cold spots 
94% of the time and all have statistically significant Mann-Kendall z-scores, demonstrating 
a decreasing trend in precipitation.  Thus, these results show a trend of decreasing 





Figure 16: Statistical Results for Northwest Cambodia118 
 
118 Data from Adler et al. 
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When compared to rice production, the map shows the vulnerability of 
northwestern Cambodia (Figure 17). Regions that have more intense rice production and 
greater precipitation deviations are more vulnerable. In cases of excessive flooding, 
farmers can try to pump the water but if it stays on the fields too long, it rots the crop. 
However, the results did not indicate significant increases in precipitation. On the other 
hand, poor rainfall means that farmers are unable to plant and grow rice, or their harvests 
are greatly diminished. The results clearly indicate that the northwestern portion of the 
country is the most vulnerable to climate effects due to the strong increase in drying and 
heavy rice production. The region experiencing increases in precipitation, the southwest, 
has little rice production and thus is at lower risk. Regions around Phnom Penh and Takeo, 
where there is rice production along the Mekong River, are at moderate risk. 
 
 
Figure 17: Agricultural Vulnerability119 
 
119 Data from Adler et al. and “Globally Spatially-Disaggregated Crop Production Statistics Data for 2010 
Version 1.1”  
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MIGRATION TRENDS 
Cambodia’s migration history and patterns are heavily influenced by its political 
history. During the Khmer Rouge regime (1975-1979), an estimated 35-40% of the 
population were internally displaced, mostly through forced migration from urban centers 
to rural communes.120 Following the fall of the regime at the hands of the Vietnamese army, 
the Khmer Rouge and Vietnamese-backed People’s Republic of Kampuchea continued to 
struggle for control until the Paris Peace Agreement in 1991. During this time period, 
around 600,000 Cambodians left the county for Thailand, France, North America, 
Australia, New Zealand, and other ASEAN nations.121 Following the peace agreement, the 
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) took control of the country 
from 1992 to 1993, and many people returned home from displaced persons camps along 
the Thai border.  
Migration from 1993 through the early 2000s was largely internal. In 2008, 26.52% 
of the Cambodian population were migrants and only 2.67% of those migrants originated 
outside of Cambodia.122 In urban areas, 57.93% of the population were migrants while 
18.90% of the rural population were migrants, suggesting a strong rural to urban migration 
trend.123 In urban areas, the majority of migrants were from rural areas, while rural migrants 
were often from other rural areas. 37.9% of migrants moved because their family moved, 
while 21.5% moved in search of employment.124 The highest proportion of migrants during 
this time period were in the 20-24 and 25-29 age groups.125 
 
120 Suzana Crassard, “Country Profile: Cambodia” (International Organization for Migration, 2009). 
121 Sarthi Acharya, “Migration Patterns in Cambodia - Causes and Consequences,” 2003. 
       David Chandler, A History of Cambodia., 4th ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2009). 
122 “General Population Census of Cambodia 2008: National Report on Final Census Results” (National 
Institute of Statistics, Ministry of Planning, August 2009). 
123 “General Population Census of Cambodia 2008: National Report on Final Census Results.” 
124 “General Population Census of Cambodia 2008: National Report on Final Census Results.” 
125 “General Population Census of Cambodia 2008: National Report on Final Census Results.” 
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In 2013, 28.9% of the population were migrants and 2.5% of those were from 
outside of Cambodia, a 2% increase in internal migrants but a negligible decrease in 
international migrants in the country relative to 2008.126 Eighty-two percent of the total 
migrants originated in rural areas, and 67.1% of the migrants in urban areas had their 
previous residence in a rural area, again suggesting a strong rural to urban migration 
trend.127 Of the total number of migrants, 42.2% moved because their family moved, while 
21.8% moved due to marriage and 13.2% moved in search of employment.128 The highest 
proportion of migrants were in the 25-29 and 30-34 age groups, indicating that migrants 
were older compared to 2008.  
While census data provides insight into internal trends, it does not provide any 
information on migrants leaving Cambodia. UN data indicates that more and more 
Cambodians are emigrating abroad to find jobs, driven by low domestic wages and limited 
domestic job opportunities.129 In 2000, the number of Cambodians overseas was only 3.7% 
of the population, about 450,000 people (Table 6).130 By 2015, an estimated 1.19 million 
Cambodian were emigrants, constituting 7.6% of the country’s population. Thailand is the 
most common destination for Cambodian migrants, receiving 68% in 2015. This marks a 
significant increase from 2000, where Thailand received only 34% of Cambodian migrants, 




126 “Cambodia Inter-Censal Population Survey 2013: Final Report.” 
127 “Cambodia Inter-Censal Population Survey 2013: Final Report.” 
128 “Cambodia Inter-Censal Population Survey 2013: Final Report.” 
129 OECD and Cambodia Development Resource Institute, Interrelations between Public Policies, 
Migration and Development in Cambodia, OECD Development Pathways (OECD, 2017), 
https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264273634-en. 
130 OECD and Cambodia Development Resource Institute. 
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  2000 2015 
Migrants (% out of total population) 3.7% 7.6% 
Destination Countries 
(% of total migrants) 
Thailand 34% 68% 
USA 30% 14% 
France 16% 5% 
Australia 5% 3% 
Table 6: Migration Destinations from Cambodia131 
Most international migrants are unskilled men seeking work in agriculture, fishing 
and fishery processing, sawmills, factories, construction, private households, or the sex 
trade (Table 7).132 The majority of Cambodian migrants in Thailand are undocumented. 
Approximately 10% of Cambodian migrants emigrate through legal channels.133 As of 
2008, around 90% of the migrants in Thailand were irregular labor migrants.134 These 
seasonal migrants are unlikely to migrate legally due to the cost and time involved. Most 
migrants are concentrated in the eastern half of Thailand near the Cambodian border, as 





131 Data from “Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2015 Revision” (United Nations, Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2015). 
132 Bruno Maltoni, “Impact of Remittances on Local Communities in Cambodia: The Case of Prey Veng 
Province” (World Bank, 2005). 
133 Max Tunon and Rim Khleang, “Cross-Border Labour Migration in Cambodia: Considerations for the 
National Employment Policy,” Working Paper (International Labour Organization, October 2013). 
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Industry People Percent of Migrants 
Fisheries & related 20,989 16.8% 
Farming and livestock & related 31,162 25% 
Construction 32,465 26% 
Mining/quarrying 61 0.1% 
Wholesale and retail 4,778 3.8% 
Food and beverage 4,483 3.6% 
Housemaids 6,578 5.3% 
Others 24,245 19.4% 
Table 7: Irregular Migrants in Thailand by Sector (2009)136 
Notably, undocumented migrant workers are enormously underestimated, and the 
numbers are likely far higher in reality. In 2014, more than 250,000 irregular Cambodian 
migrants returned home due to fear of arrest from Thai authorities.137 In August 2017, 
203,732 Cambodian irregular migrants in Thailand registered as part of a push to legitimize 
irregular migrants.138 These numbers suggest a far greater presence of undocumented 
Cambodian migrant workers in Thailand than are reported even through survey data. 
In 2014, the main migrant-sending provinces were Banteay Meanchey, 
Battambang, and Siem Reap, followed by Prey Veng and Takeo (Table 8).139  
 
136 Data from S Paitoonpong and Y Chalamwong, “Managing International Labor Migration in ASEAN: A 
Case of Thailand” (Thailand Development Research Institute, 2012), http://tdri.or.th/wp-
content/uploads/2013/07/h117.pdf. 
137 “Cambodia: Thailand Worker Exodus Tops 250,000,” Al Jazeera, accessed March 15, 2020, 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia-pacific/2014/06/cambodia-thailand-worker-exodus-tops-250000-
2014626145249756686.html. 
138 David Sen, “200,000 Migrant Workers Register in Thailand,” Khmer Times, August 9, 2017, 
http://www.khmer-timeskh.com/5077325/200000-migrant-workers-register-thailand/. 
139 Naomi Hatsukano, “Returned Migrant Workers in Cambodia: Motivations for Moving and Economic 
Reintegration” (Institute of Developing Economies - Japan External Trade Organization, 2019). 
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Province Number of Persons 
Banteay Meanchey 127,346 
Battambang 84,393 
Siem Reap 53,335 
Prey Veng 49,648 
Takeo 31,418 
All others 539,937 
Table 8: Emigration by Province (2014)140 
The three largest contributors, Banteay Meanchey, Battambang, and Siem Reap, 
are all northwestern provinces along the border with Thailand and are reliant on agriculture. 
These three provinces also have the greatest drying trends (Figures 16 and 17). This 
suggests a link between agricultural vulnerability and migration, although statistical 
establishment of such a relationship is beyond the scope of this paper. 
The decision to migrate is complex. Workers may move due to push factors such 
as poverty, lack of employment, landlessness, debt, and natural disasters. The effects of 
climate change may be incorporated in other factors, such as poverty and agricultural 
losses, driving the decisions to migrate. As climate change puts pressure on rural 
communities that are still heavily dependent on agriculture, however, irregular migration 
to Thailand may be increasing. 
The focus group surveys exposed the vulnerability of locals to climate effects. The 
majority of participants cited either excessive flooding or not enough rain as their greatest 
climate concerns. In cases of excessive flooding, the focus groups said they would try to 
 
140 Data from Hatsukano. 
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pump the water but if it stayed on the fields too long, it would rot the crop. Conversely, not 
enough rain meant they would be unable to plant and grow rice crops. Most communities 
have retaining ponds that hold some water, but pumping systems are limited and water 
levels are typically at their lowest before the onset of the rainy season. Thus, changes in 
the variability of water is critically important for the success or failure of rice harvests.  
Many communities also have livestock, vegetable gardens, and fish stocks. These 
are all used as coping mechanisms when rice crops fail. Group members said that if a rice 
crop failed, they would sell fish or vegetables at the market. Most families did not have 
any savings, and all their assets were in infrastructure and livestock. When asked what they 
would do if these were not enough, if a family member fell ill, or if another adverse event 
occurred, most community members said that a family member would have to migrate for 
work. All groups mentioned migration as a potential coping mechanism. They frequently 
mentioned cassava plantations in Thailand as a potential source of income.  
A study by Bylander surveyed households with and without migrants to assess 
whether they had experienced poor rainfall in the previous year. Of households that sent 
migrants to Thailand in 2009, 50% experienced poor rainfall in 2008. (Figure 18).141 On 
the contrary, only 20% of non-migrant sending households experienced poor rainfall in 
2008. Of the migrant-sending households, 75% experienced differences in rainfall onset 
during the previous year, while only 55% of non-migrant sending households experienced 
differences in rainfall onset. Of households that sent migrants in 2009, 60% experienced 
poor distribution of rainfall during the previous year, while only 20% of the non-migrant 
sending households experienced poor distribution of rainfall. The greatest disparity in rates 
of migration by household occurred where the distribution of rainfall was worse than 
 
141 Bylander, “Cambodian Migration to Thailand: The Role of Environmental Shocks and Stress.” 
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normal, although changes in the amount and onset of rainfall also had large differences. 
Additionally, 14% of households that sent migrants in 2009 also reported significant crop 
losses in their previous harvest (Figure 19). Only 4% of households not sending migrants 
reported crop losses. 
 
 
Figure 18: Percent of Households Reporting Rainfall Insecurity142 
 
Figure 19: Percent of Households Reporting Crop Losses143 
 
142 Figure from Bylander. 
143 Figure from Bylander. 
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Multivariate models by Bylander, controlling for other explanatory factors, found 
the households that experienced crop loss were two times as likely to have a family member 
migrate.144 Households that experienced drought were three times more likely to have a 
family member migrate. Households that reported poor rainfall were two times more likely 
to have a family member migrate. Flooding had no significant association with migration. 
A final analysis found that households that experienced crop loss (not in a drought context) 
were more likely to migrate than households in a drought context (but not experiencing 
crop loss). This suggests that migration is a response to environmental sensitivity and the 
risk to livelihoods rather than a direct response to climate shocks. However, it is important 
to note that the decision to migrate does not occur in a vacuum, and other key drivers such 
as indebtedness, displacement, and family migration due to marriage continue to affect 















Chapter 5:  Discussion 
Given the results explored in Chapter 4, it is clear that future climate change will 
affect migration patterns in Cambodia. The country has the necessary preconditions for 
climate migration: low adaptive capacity, poor social safety nets, and low government 
legitimacy. Despite improvements in the standard of living and other economic measures 
of wellbeing, Cambodia remains a fragile state and its citizens are highly vulnerable to the 
effects of climate change. As elucidated in the focus group surveys, Cambodians are 
effectively one disaster or event away from being unable to care for themselves or their 
families.  
The climate analysis results demonstrated an increase in drying in the northwest 
region of the country, which is also highly dependent on agriculture. These drying trends 
are intensifying, suggesting that future climate effects will continue the trend. An important 
part of the analysis is the comparison of precipitation trends and rice production. Some of 
the heaviest rice production in Cambodia occurs in the northwest portion of the country, 
which is also the most affected by drying trends. These are also regions that are very rural 
and reliant on agriculture, particularly in Banteay Meanchey. The focus groups said 
inadequate rainfall meant they would be unable to plant and grow rice crops, or their 
harvests would be greatly reduced. Thus, changes in the variability of water is critically 
important for the success or failure of rice harvests. Households in these regions will have 
to find coping mechanisms to adapt to climate change effects. 
One such coping mechanism is migration, and research has shown a significant link 
between rainfall insecurity, crop losses, and migration. Rainfall insecurity during the 
previous year and crop losses during the previous harvest season both had the effect of 
increasing migration to Thailand during the following year. These conclusions are 
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supported by the focus group results – respondents often noted that if climate change 
affected their crop cycles too much, they would have to migrate to seek work along the 
Thai border.  
This research is important in two ways: first, it uses novel spatiotemporal analysis 
techniques to identify regions of Cambodia that are more vulnerable to the effects of 
climate change than others. These regions are primarily in the northwest of the country and 
are experiencing intensifying drying trends. Second, using existing research, this study 
explores a pathway between climate change and migration, concluding that rainfall scarcity 
does lead to migration in the Cambodian context. Knowing that the northwest is the most 
vulnerable to rainfall scarcity and that rainfall scarcity can lead to migration, this research 
thus indicates that the northwestern provinces of Banteay Meanchey, Battambang, and 
Siem Reap are the most likely to experience climate-induced migration. If precipitation 
continues to diminish, we will likely see an increase in migration from these provinces. 
Based on these results, funding needs to be devoted to additional research on the 
effects of climate change on migration in Cambodia, especially in the northwestern 
provinces. Additionally, the Cambodian government and international organizations 
should direct funding towards policies that increase the resilience of the region’s 
agricultural communities. Clearly, vulnerable households are unable to adapt to climate 
change and turn towards migration as a coping mechanism. This has the potential to stress 
finite government resources or lead to tensions along the Cambodian-Thai border. Such 
policies could include expanding existing climate initiatives, improving climate-resilient 
development, and improving labor and migration policies with an eye towards future 
drivers of migration.  
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Chapter 6:  Conclusion 
The purpose of this research was to analyze climate vulnerabilities and security 
risks in Cambodia. This research used a combination of quantitative data measures and 
qualitative surveys to offer a holistic picture of the relationship between rainfall variability 
and migration in Cambodia. Ultimately, it concluded that that precipitation is decreasing 
in the northwest portion of the country. This, in turn, leaves northwestern Cambodia 
vulnerable to climate-induced crop losses and increased migration to Thailand.  
The Cambodian government and international organizations should direct funding 
towards research to better understand the situation in northwestern Cambodia and policies 
that increase the resilience of the region’s agricultural communities. Future research should 
address two things: first, how climate change projections for the county vary spatially and 
temporally; and second, how climate change and migration are linked in a robust study that 
addresses all potential reasons for migration. Cambodian policymakers need quality 
spatially disaggregated data that projects climate effects into the future to adequately plan 
for changes. Additionally, more research needs to be done to disentangle the many factors 
that contribute to the decision to migrate and which provinces are sending the most climate 
migrants.  
Ultimately, climate change poses a high risk to agricultural productivity in the 
northwest portion of the country and will likely lead to increased migration from that area 
– this research elucidates that trend. Cambodian and international policymakers should use 
this study to conduct research and implement policies that increase the resilience of the 
region’s vulnerable communities. 
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Appendices 
A - PROVINCE SPELLINGS BY ADMIN CODE 
1. Banteay Meanchey 
2. Battambang 
3. Kampong Cham 
4. Kampong Chhnang 
5. Kampong Speu 
6. Kampong Thom 
7. Kampot 
8. Kandal 
9. Koh Kong 
10. Kratie 
11. Mondul Kiri 
12. Phnom Penh 
13. Preah Vihear 
14. Prey Veng 
15. Pursat 
16. Ratanak Kiri 
17. Siem Reap 
18. Preah Sihanouk 
19. Stung Treng 
20. Svay Rieng 
21. Takeo 
22. Oddar Meanchey 
23. Kep 
24. Pailin 
25. Tboung Khmum 
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B - FOCUS GROUP SURVEYS 
Introduction/Purpose 
Explain purpose of research: to determine local climate change perceptions and 
understand how people are able to adapt. To understand how climate change stresses 
communities and if it can lead to conflict.  
I wish to write notes on this conversation for my own records – is that ok? The notes will 
be kept anonymous. No identifying information about you will be written down or 









Number of people in focus group:  
Age(s): 
Gender(s):  
Est. years of schooling:  
Est. # of hectares/rai:  
   
Perceptions of Group: 
 
Climate Change Questions  
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1. What do you do for a living?  
2. In the past 5 years, have you experienced any form of flood damage?  
3. In the past 5 years, have you experienced any hardship from drought?  
4. Which concerns you more, flooding or droughts?  
5. Do you feel the weather is generally changing?  
6. Have you noticed any changes in rainfall? In the monsoon season? 
7. Has your fish harvest or rice crop changed in the past few years?  
a. If yes: do people get angry over it? Worried? What do they blame it on?  
8. Have any major climate events impacted agriculture? What is your perception of 
the level of risk? Do you have any stories to support this?  
9. Do villagers notice changes in rice yields?  
10. Do you worry about your livelihood?  
11. Have you heard of the phrase “climate change” or “global warming”? What do you 
know about it?  
12. Have any government agencies or NGOs helped train you about climate 
change? Has this helped you? In what ways?  
  
Adaptation Questions  
1. In the past 5 years, have you noticed too much or too little rain?   
2. When you have too much rain in a year, what do you do?  
3. When you have too little rain in a year, what do you do?  
4. If flooding damages your house or crop, what do you do?  
5. If someone in your family gets sick, what do you do?  
6. What do you do if the fish harvest is poor?  
7. Where do you get your water? Do you usually have clean water?  
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8. What is your main food source?  
9. Do you have any savings or financial assets? If something bad were to happen, 
would you feel financially prepared for it?   
10. Are you able to plan for the future, or do you feel you are always catching up to 
things?  
11. What do you do to reduce climate risk?  
12. Have you implemented any climate smart technologies? Are new technologies hard 
to adopt? What makes you ready to adopt climate smart technologies?  
13. Do government agencies or NGOs ever support your efforts to plan for the 
harvest? What training programs have you done to help learn about climate change 
adaptation?  
  
Security Questions  
1. When you have a year with too little rain, how do people usually react? 
2. When you have a year with too much rain, how do people usually react? 
3. What changes have villagers noticed about the weather? How do they feel about it 
– angry? Worried?  
4. Do people in your community ever fight over resources such as water, rice, or fish? 
How do they resolve it?  
5. If you and a neighbor disagreed over who gets to use a resource (such as water), 
what would you do about it?  
6. If you think something is unfair, what would you do about it?  
7. Have people in your village heard about dams that could impact the flooding of the 
Mekong? What do they think?  
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a. If the water went away, who’s fault would it be? What would you do about 
it?  
8. What do young people do in the villages?  
a. Do any of them leave? If so, why?  
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